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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to research the history of the Patriot weapon 
system, focusing on the acqui~i tjon strategy used in the project office, the 
evolution/upgrades of the weapon system, and the successcs, failures. and lessons 
learncd fro m Desert Shield/Desert Storm. An analysis is conducted to examine 
the effectiveness of the acquisition strategy in terms of cost, schedule, 
performance, the ability of the Project Office to upgrade the system through the 
Patriot Advanced Capab ility Programs (PAC). and the performance of Patriot 
missiles against Scud mis~ile aLlacks in Southwest Asia. This thesis concludes 
that the success of the Patriot project can be attributed to a combined evolutionary 
strategy and a Preplanned Product Improvement (P3I) approach, which allowed the 
Patriot system to evolve and counter a dynamic threat environment. Thc thesis 
offers a number of recommendations for application in future missile system 
projccts. 
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AREA OF RESEARCH 
T:1.e area of researcr. f or this th~sis is the acqu i si::: i on 
strategy for tlle Patriot Air Defense Missile System. 
specifical l y, th j s thesis will address whaL acquis ition 
s t ra t egy was used in the Patriot project and ~ow this strategy 
provided a meaIlS f or improving the system's !Jer[ormance '",hile 
minimizing risks in terms o[ costs and schedule delays . 
B . RESEARCB QUESTIONS 
The p::-imary research question this thes i s wi l l answer is; 
How effective was the evoh .:.tjonary acqui.sition strategy that 
served as the basis for the Patr i ot Air Defense Mi ssil e 
System's acqClisition plan? 
The fo U 0'",in9 subsidiary research questions will also be 
addre ssed; 
What are the elements of the evol utionary acquisi-
tion strategy used in the r=atriot program? 
2 . To what extent was the preplanned p:::-oduct i mprove-
ment {P3I) concept e mployed i.n the Pat:::-iol ~issi l e Program and 
how effective was its use? 
3. To what ex:::ent has the utilization of the lessons 
learned from Fatriot's i:"wol verr.ent i n Dese.r.t Storm refi.ned , 
modified, or changed the acquisition strategy of the Patri ot 
program? 
4. To what extent can the acquisition strategy of 
Patriot be refined to improve its use and how might th is 
strategy be used for future missile systems'? 
C . DISCUSS I ON 
The Phased Array Tracking to Intercept of Target (Pa triot l 
System was originally designed for the European theater to 
counter Sovie~ fixed - wing and rotary - wing aircraft. The 
system, originally known as the SA.t.\1-D ( Surface - ~o - Air-Missile 
Development), r eplaced the Nike - Hercules missile system, which 
was one of the mainstays of U. S. air defense for more than 25 
years.l '1'lithin the 32d Army Air Defense COrTh'11and, Patriot 
firing units were typically deployed forward in a belt de fense 
along the Inter - German Border and in the rear areas in defense 
o f high value assets. 
The development of the Patriot system was in respoI'.se to 
various air defense studies conducted in the 1968's. The 
purpose of the studies was to examine t he capability of 
e xisting air defense systems in countering the growth 
capahility of threat aircraft. 2 These studies revealed ~hat 
l."Nike Hercules Phased Out in CONUS", Air Defense A~ 
Bulle-in, March 1983, p. 1. 
2weiner, Ben W.K . , and Leo C. Ramp, Jr ., "The Army's First 
Patriot Batta lio:l.", Air Defense Mag~, April -June 1982, p . 35. 
the Hawk and Ni ke Hercules HlMAD (High to Mediur.l Air Defense) 
systems we:::-e inddequate and should be repl aced by a newer 
system possessing the fol l owi ng attr i butes : 
High firepowe:::-. 
Resistance to e l ectronic counte::::ne asures. 
High ki l l capaoility agains;t maneuving aircraft and 
aircraft in formation. 
Low manning requirements. 
Minimum l ogistics burden. 
High mobi l ity and speedy emplacement. 
Growth potential to encounter inc:::-easing threat 
capabilities. 3 
The PatrioL Air Defense syste m contains a number of 
inherent features designed to provide t hese capabi l itie s. 
The initial design and production of the system incorporate d 
the latest tr,; chnologie s available, such as a L:::-ack -via-r:tissile 
capability, consisting of a high speed, high maneuverable 
missile, and a multi-functione d phased a:::-ray radar (AN/MPQ -
53), wh i ch allowed the system to simu l taneously track and 
e ngage r:tul t iplc targets. Other features included a r e duction 
in the amount of cabling, which significant l y r e duced the time 
r e quired tc e mp l ace Lhe system , and a launcher with four, 
3.llU..Q. 
fully self contained missile, which effectively eliminated the 
requirement for mis:;ile maintenance at the unit level (See Table 1 -
1 ) . 
TABLE 1-1 FEATURES OF THE PATRIOT SYSTEM 
- PHASED ARRAY ANTENNA WITH ELECTRONIC BEAM STEERING 
~ ~~~~~WE~~~GE APERTURE 
HIGH PKRFORMANCE MISSILE 
· HIGH SPEED 
· HIGH MANEUVERABILITY 
• ACCURATE ECM RESISTANT GUIDANCE 
· LARGER WARHEJill 
- HIGH SPEED, HIGH CAPACITY DIGITAL COMPt1I'ER 
- ADAPTABLE SOFTWAAK CONTROL 
- RAD= 
- MISSILE GUIDANCE 
- SYSTEM OPERATION 
Patriot Project Office Briefing, Se ptember 199] 
During the early 1980's, the acquisition strategy for Patriot 
included the Patriot . Advanced Capability Programs (PAC- l and PAC-
2), which emphasized increased lethality through software and 
hardware improvements. This capability, which was first fielded i n 
1989 , was recently demonstrated during Desert Storm, w:Jere Patriot 
missile batteries successfully defended against Iraqi Scud missile 
attacks . 
Current acquisition st rategy includes a PAC - 3 missile prcgram, 
which is characterized as ", .. a combinatiun of integrated 
complementary system improvements". 4 
At the present time, the Patriot system is considered the 
" ... cornerstone of the theater army's integrated air 
defense.,,5 With the i ncreasing threat capahili ty of tactical 
ballistic-: missiles, the only system currently in production 
with the ability ~o counter this threat is the Patriot PAC-:< 
missile. This thesi.s will exa:nine the history of the Patriot: 
weapon system, focusing on the acq:uisition strategy, the 
evolution and upgrades of the weapon syste:n, the successes, 
failure s, and lessons learned from Desert Storm, ami the 
C'..lrrent and future trends for the Patriot Mis sile System. 
SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
The scope of the thesis wil l ir:clude the a cqu isition 
strategy of the Patriot, the roles and missions that Patriot 
'",as des':gr,ed to handle, and an a na l ysis of the prohlems and 
lessons learned trom its dep l oyment to Southwest Asia . This 
thes .i s also discusses unclassified system characteristics a:ld 
capabilities. 
4Based or. information con~ained in a 
criefing titled, "Pat:riot Growth Progra:n 
l\;.1g~lst l4, 1992 . 
5"MSD (Missi l e 
Missile Messenger, 
delivers 2,::)00 Patriot", Thp 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis follows a case study format. The methodology 
involved two data types; interview data and the examination 
of articles, journals, periodicals, training manuals, and 
Patriot system documentat ion provided by the Patriot Project 
Office in Huntsville, Alabama. Researc;") also included reports 
retrieved by means of an automated searc;") for Patriot data 
available at the Defense Tecr.nology Informatior. Center. 
Interviews were conducted with the Deputy Patriot Project 
Manager, the Assistant Project Man<lger, and various dep<lrtment 
managers with::'n the project office. Thesis research travel to 
t he Patriot Project Office occurred from September 13 to 
September 18, 1993. 
F. BENEFITS OF THE THESIS 
By examining the overall success of the Patr::'ot Missile 
system, this thesis serves as a basis for future research and 
discussion on tailoring the right acquisition strategy for 
major weapon systems. A second objective is to consolidate 
various reports, documents, articles, and program manager 
perspectives into a single source reference for Patriot. 
II. EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER 
An acquisition strategy provides a c::lOceptual :ramework o f 
the overal l p l an that a program manager follows in the 
execat_ion of his program. Typica l e l e:nents of an acquisition 
strategy inc l ude the contracting process, schedulir.g of 
essential e l ements . demonstration of test and evaluation 
criteria, solicitations for proposal s, and several issues tha t 
address proj ecting life · cycle costs ar.d the ad:ninistration of 
contracting procedures. This chapter wil l examine t he 
acquisition strategy empl oyed during the initiation of the 
Patriot project, the concepts of evoluti::mary acquisition 
strategy a nj prep l anncd product improvement, and how the 
Patrio t Project Manager emp l oyed these strategies i r;: the 
execution of his progra!ll. 
B. THE CONCEPT OF EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
Evol utionary Acqu i sition Strategy i s an approach that 
permits a system to be fielde d and subsequently upgraded as 
new requirements and technologies are r e fined. Department of 
Defense Instruction 5000. 2 . Part 5, Section A, defin!'> s 
evolutionary acquis i tion strategy as; 
... an approach in which a core capability is fielded, and 
the system design has a modular structure and provis i ons 
for future upgrades and changes as requirements are 
refined . An evolutionary acquisition st r ategy is well 
suited to high technology and software intensive programs 
~e~r~o~e~~~~:~:~~~~;,Yo;:: ~e~~~~dc.a1ability can generally, 
A preplanned product improvement strategy is defined as : 
.. . a phased approach which incrementally satisfies 
operational requirements in order to address the cost , 
risk . or relative time urgency of different elements of 
the system b e ing developed. With this approach, selecte d 
capabilities are defe r red so that the system can be 
fielded while the def e rred element is devel oDed i n a 
paralle l or subsequent effort. 7 ~ 
The Patriot Project Office has incorporated aspects of 
both evolutionary and preplanned production improveme ll1: 
strategies in the acquisition of this syste m. The current 
acquiSition approach describes Patriot as a missile system 
that is : 
. . . modular in nature . character i zed by high tecr.nology and 
is software intensive. The Patriot Gr owth Program is 
based on an evolutionary acquisition strac egy and consists 
of a phased series of Preplanned Product Improvements 
lP3I) and enhancements derived from the Patriot 
Reliabili ty, Availability, and Maintainablli ty (RA."'l) 
Growth program . The adopted acquisition strategy provi des 
a flexible, low- risk approach to improving syst.em 
performance . Its primary goal is to minimize the time and 
cost of satisfying an identified , validated need 
consistent with common sense, 
6Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), p enar t ment of 
Def"'nse Instruction NYmber 5000 . 2, Department of Defense, Feb r uary 
23, 1991, p. 5 - A· S . 
7Th.i.Q . 
practices and the basic poli c i es 
DoD Directive 5000.1., Defense 
C. HOW THIS STRATEGY WAS USED IN THE PATRIOT PROJECT 
Thi.s section will track the acquisition strategy that was 
employ ed in the Patriot Project. It will also examine the 
significant events thilt occurred during each program phase and 
milestone decision. 
1 . Concept Oefini tion 
The Patriot Pro ject officially begiln in August 1.965 
with the Secretary of Defense ' s aut:horization of Concept 
Definition. This authorizaticn Il'arked the creatioIl of the 
Patriot Project Office at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, 
Alabarr~. 3 The l ong· range plan fur Patriot, formerly called 
the SAM-D (Surface-to - a i r - missi1e-Deve l opment), was to replace 
both Hawk (Homing - a11 - the Way -Killer) and Nike Hercules air 
defe:lse weapons .10 In August 1. 966, t:he Raytheon Company won 
a five month, $2.5 mil lion contract to defi:le the cOIlcept of 
t he system. 
Offic e ",' "Oq",s ,,"'n1.~~~~t~~~ ~~~. Patriot Frogram", Patriot Project 
OlAdapted from a case study entitled, "Defender (Patriot) 
Project History", September 1.993, p. 1. 
lOward , Bob , "Army Surface to Air Awaits Okay; 
Use by Navy Also Eyed", Huntsv-i 11e Times, p. 1. 
2. Advanced Developme n t 
The completion of Concept Definition and the beginning 
of the Advanced Development phas e occ u rred in May 1967. Prior 
to Advanced Development p hase , the Source Selection Evaluation 
Eoard and Source Se lection Advisory Council conducted an 
extensive review of four proposals for the advanced 
development of the SAM - D (Patriot) missile s y stem. These 
proposals came from four industrial firms: Radio Cor poration 
of America, General Electric Company , Hughes Aircraft Company, 
and Raytheon. The Commanding General, Army Materiel Command , 
acting in the capacity of SAM-D Contract Definition Source 
Selection Aa thority, decide d that firm fixed price contracts 
for Subphase B of t he contract should be a warded to Radio 
Corporation of America, Raytheon Company , and Hughes Aircraft 
Company . 11 
The f ou r proposals were evaluated by a Source 
Selection Evalu ation Board from January 3 to March 24, 1967. 
On May 18, 1967, resu lts of the board were announced ; they 
selected Raytheon 's proposal and awarded the company a $2 . 1 
million letter contract. The entire development contract was 
estimated at $1.1 billion, with over $100 million allocated 
for the Advanced Development of the system and over $1 billion 
for follow - on production . 12 Raytheon officials attributed 
l l.lb.i.d. . 
12"Raytheon Wins $2 . 1 million Sam-D Con t ract " , Based on 
information stated in a Raytheon Newsletter, 1967 , p. 1. 
10 
attribuLed their suc::.:ess ~n winn ing botr. contracts to an 
i mp-::-cssive array of c ompany - financed I nternal Deve18pment. 
Prograrr·.s, such as the Ferrite Array Demonstration (FAD), work 
on microe l ectron i c circuits, <ldvanees i n digital co:nputers, 
new guidance teclmiques, dnd advanced concepts '--n command and 
control and logis:::ics. The contractor proved its abil i ty to 
inLegrate these tech:lOlogies in November 1 969 with the tirst 
launch of the Advance d Developme!l.t missile. 
3. Engineering Development 
February 1972 rrurked the completion of Adva:lced 
Development. Upon compl etion of thi s phase , the Defense 
Systems Acquisit :i on Review Co',mcil (predecessor of the Defense 
Acquisition Board) conducted a readiness review of the Patriot 
syst e m. The following month, the Patriot Project Office 
received approval from che Deputy Secretary of Defense to 
enter the Engineering Development: phase of the project. 
During Engineering Dev elopment, Raytheon was subsequently 
awarded a Cost Plus Incentive ? ee, Award Fee contract, with 
~ncremental fU!l.ding through calendar year 1 9 7711 . 
In February 1974, the Patr i ot Office was directed by 
the Sec~etary uf Defense to halt the p:::-oject for 21 months to 
demonstrate the Track - Vi a - Missile (TVM) guidance concept. 
13 "Defender (Patriot) Project :-1istory", Patriot Proj ect 
Office, September 1993, p. l. 
11 
This "Proof of Concept:" requirement resul ted in a 
restruc,:uring of the Patriot project by a letter contract 
modification on February 11, 1974. On June 6, 1974, a 
DSARC/DAB reviewed the Anny's proposal, which redirected the 
Patriot Project . The recommendations of the DSARC/DAB were 
published by memorandum on June 27, 1974, with the following 
efforts approved by the Deputy Secre':ary of 
Defense : 
• Track - via-missile ( 'I'VM) Proof-of - Principle (POP) firing 
program. 
• A minimum development effort to pennit continuation of 
Patriot II (an austere version of Patriot) into full - scale 
development after successful completion of POP. 
• A cost reduction effort; and 
• A complementary effort to examine backup guidance 
options. 14 
After several successful guidance f l ight tests ami an 
electronic counter-measures (ECM) flight test in December 
1976, the program received approval in January 1976 to resume 
Full Scale Engineering Development. Raytheon was awarded a 
49 -month, $425 million contract for completion of Patriot 
system development on August 1 , 1976. The contract stated 
that Patriot would "design, build, and test four sets of 
tactical Patriot equipment for the Army" . 15 The cO:ltract 
p. 1. 
12 
included Producibility Engineering and Planning (PEP) effort.s , 
which were initiated in October 1977 16 . 
On Novembe r 26. 1977. a decision was rendered by the 
D$ARC to accelerat.e t.he scheduled initial deployment of the 
Pat.riot. s ys tem by t.wo years. Though t.he baseline Eor 
engineering development. remained unchanged , the decision 
resulted in the e l imination of che low- rat.e init.ial production 
phase and t.he DSARC IlIA . Developmental testing/operat.ional 
testing III was a lso eliminated and replaced by a Production 
Confirmatory Test and a Follow-on Evaluation on the init.ial 
product.ion equipment. 17 
Air Defense ArtjlJery Bulleti n reported that the 
first Patriot: flight cests were conducted in 1978, the first. 
on June 22 , and the second on August 31 . The first test was 
declared a "no test," because the missile self -destructed 
before target intercept . The second miss i le launch was 
successful and performed exact l y as programmed ; the missile 
then self - destructed 10 seconds before intercept. 18 By 
October 1978, a tota l of 33 Patriot missiles were flight 
tested . The resu l ts of these tests were: 27 successes, two 
partial successes , one unsuccessful test, and three "no tests 
16Illl.d. ., p . 2 . 
17l.Qi..Q . 
18s heppard , LTC John , "Patriot Update' • Air Defense Art illery 
~. October 1978, p . 2. 
19.IQ.iQ. . 
13 
The first missile-to-missile flight test occurred at 
W!!ite Sands Missile Range in 1379 . In this test, a Patriot 
missile destroyed a Nike Hercules missile on a f l ight profile 
similar to an anti-ba l listic missile at high altitude . 
Developmental Testing and Operational Testing II 
lOT/aT II} official l y commenced on 19 November 1979. O'1' /OT 
was delayed for several months due to prob l ems with system 
hardware and software. aT-tYpe mini-war tests were conducted 
but a full test of Patriot's ability to operate as a system 
oould not be evaluated. Shortfalls were identified in 
reliabi l ity , Il'.aintainability, target identificdtion, and 
electronic counter-counter measures (ECCM) perforIl'.ance. 20 
These OT-type search and track tests, which began in April 
1980, demonstrated shortcomings regarding readiness for 
deployment. When testing resumed, the usual DT/OT ser,:uence 
was reversed and the tests were partially melded. After 
several interruptions, the test concluded on Marc h 28, 1980. 
4. Limited Production 
Six months after completion of OT/OT II, the system 
entered limited production. 21 On September 1980 , the 
ASARC/DSARC approved Milestone I II, and the project proceeded 
20 "Defender (Patriot) Projec t History", Patriot Projec t 
Office, September 1993, p. 2. 
21Document generated by the Patriot Project Office, 
Huntsville, AI, titled "Patriot Executive Summary", Decer:Jber 1991, 
p. 2. 
14 
to Phase II I . Production and Deploymer.t. The approval to 
enter this phasl'! wa~ initially fOe limited production only, 
with a fu ture decision to enter full scale product ion 
centingeYlt on the rl'!Rul t8 of initial production tests that 
wc!:e planned for the 1982 - 1983 t~.meframe . Thl'! Council also 
directed the Patriot Of:ioc to carry ou t its growth program 
and prescribed a s 8ries of four test units to display system 
perforIl'.anc8, reliability, and maintainability before 
authorizing a full production dccision. 
~n 1981, the Patriot Preplanned Preduct Imprcverr.ent 
(P3I) Program was initiated. This ?rogram was iYl keeping with 
Sl'!cretary of Defense Frank Carlucci's Initiative #7. 
Preplanned Produc t Improvement (P3I), whi c h directed an 
evolutionary approach to minimize technological risk, 
consciously i nsert advanced technologies , and incorporatc 
planned upgrades . 
In early 1981 , the Fatriot office developed a concept 
known as t he Patriot IV:aintenance Enhancem8nt Program. '~Hth 
the exception in the area of maintainability, test results 
demonstrated that the correct i v e measures had been effective 
in the elimi nation of previously identified shortcomi:1gs. I n 
November 1981, a Maintenance Improvement Program (MIP) 
established to address the rr.a.intainahility shortfall, with 
particular emphasis on i mproving the reliability of Patriot's 
fault locali.zation ca.pability. 
5. Full Production 
Full Production (Milestone III) approval was granted 
in April 1982. Raytheon was subsequently awarded a cost 
plus-incentive fee (CPIF) contract worth $110,307 , 690. This 
CP IF contract allowed the cDntractor to continue its basic 
engineering development and P31 efforts. 22 From April to 
June 1982 , the project office condu cted a Development 
Confirmation Test Series. These tests were part of a program 
mandated by the Secretary of De:cnse to display capabilities 
not thoroughly shown in earlier development and operational 
tests. The system received a successful rating of 112 percent . 
with 52 successes out of 63 scorable flights. 23 Upon test 
completion, the first production set was delivered in June 
1 952. 
The Patriot system's Initial Operational Capability 
(IOC) for CONUS (Continental United States) occurred on June 
1983. The unit that achieved this IOC was .lst Battalion, 43d 
Air Defense Artillery, at Fort Bliss, Texas. 
Follow - on Evaluation (FOE) testing was conducted by 
the Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) from May 
through July 1983. This $25 mi llion evaluation consisted of 
two tests; FOE I, which examined the soldiers' ability to man 
22"Historical Report", Patriot ?roject Office, October 1, 1987 
to September 30, 19115, p. 3. 
23"Patriot Confirmation Testing Comple t ed", £l.i r DeFens e 
M&g~, April-June .19 82, p. 46. 
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the system; and, FOE II, which was a four · phase co:nprehensive 
test of t h e system itself . 24 J:.'hase I was an evaluation of 
the Patri ot missile's e ffectiveness in an electronic counter 
{ECM) environrnent . Phase II, known as thF! 
Search/Track Phase, was s cheduled for June 1983, with Phase 
III, the Maneuver Phase, schedule d during the first two weeks 
of the fol l ow::'ng month. The ~o\lrth phase , Live Fire, was 
scheduled for July 16 to August 22, 1983. 
The tests , however , were terrr.inated on J u.1y 28 due to 
problems with system rel i ability and :naintainability, 
pri:narily caused by radar dowIl time . AS a result , the Under 
Secre tary of Defense, James Ar.tbrose, d i recteri that the 
European deployment of Patriot be delayed until the 
" ... system's reliability matured to an acceptable level. ,,25 
The corrunandant of the United State s Army Air Defense School , 
Fort Bli ss, Texas, addressed the problem in the J une/Ju l y 1983 
... the equipment didn't work as advert i sed. System experts 
forecast that shortcomi ngs could be corrected in f i ve 
weeks. Army leadership and ADA cOITUTl\lni ~y were not 
satisf i ed that the shortcomings could be corre cted, so 
the Patriot program was ta:<en , off of the IOC 
concept ar.d placed on a mi lestone schedule. 26 
24Strawther, craig, 
=E~~~, 
Testing, 'l'ra i ning Continues", Ai;:;: 
1983, p. 3. 
25 Infante, Ma j or 3eneral (Ret) Donal d R. "The Test i ng". Air 
p e fer.se Artillery, p. 28. 
7.6Maloney , Major General (Ret) James P ., "Intercept Point", 
Air Defense A~t' llery, Winter 1985, p. 2 . 
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As a result, the system could not neet its initial 
operating da~e of April 1984 and was returned to the 
contractor for repairs . The main objective was to ensure that 
all problems were ccrrected prior to fielding, precluding the 
release of any substandard Patriot systems. 
The new schedule was broken down i nto three 
rr,ilestones. Milestone I involved training and preparation, 
and certification of personnel and equipment to begin 16 weeks 
of collective training. Another condition for Miles~one I 
cen~ered on the supportability of the equipment through the 
collective training period and the 14-week FOE I I I e valuation. 
Upon certifica~ion by the United States Army Air Defense 
School (USAADS), Milestone I I consisted of the successful 
completion of collective training. The third milestone was 
the successful conpletion of an FOE II-type evaluation. 
The system was ret·.Jrned to the contractor and a second 
FOE was scheduled to begin in February 1984. 27 In June 1984, 
the contractOr completed required equipment upgrades and 
reliability verification testing. Upon completion of the 
testing, the Patriot Project Manager briefed the Under 
Secretary of the Army and the Vice Chief of Staff o( the Army 
on the readiness of the system . A memorandum from the Under 
Secretary of the Army to the Progra.m Executive Officer 
27"Fielding of Patriot Delayed', Air Defense ~, Fall 
1983, p . 4G. 
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fol l owed, directed him to "conduc t a demonstra t ion of the 
Advanced Tactical Fatrial a!l.d prepare for a ri.ecision Milestone 
upon completion of the Demonstration [or entry inl:: o Follow On 
EViJulation 111. 28 
The systell'. was certif::ed ready in ,Tuly 1984 and 
t.esting was ini tiated . While officials signed thic; agreement, 
U . S. troops were completing their collect.ive trainir.q in 
preparation for the Follow-On Evaluation (FOE} III on J'Jly 16 , 
1984. Originally scheduled to begin in February 198 4, this 
ambitious IO - week, live - fire operational teO'l l:. WdS conducted at 
Wh:'te Sands Missi le Rany-e, New ¥.e:x:ico, by the Operaticnal Test 
and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) ar.d involved over 2. OeD 
people. 29 A maneuver pl:asc was conducted at the North 
MacGregcr maneuver area at Fort Bliss , Texas. The 
evaluation's purpose was to show tnc improvemerltS ir. syste:n 
reliability <Jained during the year a ft er conc lusion of FOE II. 
The focus of the examirlation i:lCluded the areas of mission 
performance, reliability, a vailabil i ty , rr.aip..tainabili ty , and 
Rllrvi vability. 30 
The success of FO;:;: III proved to be a "shot in the 
for the Patriot proj ect . Final t.cs t results de,:11onst.rated: 
lPat-riot) History " , Patriot Project Office, 
p . 3. 
29lJJiJ1 . 
30Infante, Major General Dcr.ald R. "The Testing", &i1.: 
'Cefense Artillery, Winter p . 28. 
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Fire cont!:."ol section major end items remained 
ope!:."ational for over one thousand hours to eliminate 
"infant mortality" problems. 
Maneuverability of the system , which included an 
extensive field problem conducted tactically under 
va!:."ious weather and nuclear, chemical, and biologica l 
protect ive postures . 
Search and tracking capability during 16 - large scale 
search and track trials, with instrumentation 
recording all of the tactical decisions by man or 
machine in the conduct of the air batt l e against 600 
sorties . 
The operational effects of human fatigue after GO days 
of intensive operations. This period included four 
sucessful live - fire engagements against full - scale 
fighter aircraft emitting electronic counterIEeasures. 
A one hundred percent increase in fire unit 
availability over FOE II. 
A mean time between failures for the entire system 
that was 117 percent of the requirement s tated in 
specificat ions . 
A 90 percent launcher operational availability. 
A 92 percent successful engagement !:."ating against 262 
hostile target presentations . 31 
The FOE III test concluded in September 1984, and one 
month later, the Secretary of the Army authorized the 
conditio:1al release of equipment for European deployt:lent. 4th 
Battalion, 3rd Air Defense Artil lery (currently 4th Battalion 
43d Air Defense Artillery) was the first Patriot battalion 
deployed to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) . The 
battalion shi~ped equipmcr.t and an advanced elewent to 
Giessen, FRG, December 5, 198 4. The remainder of the 
31Thi.O,., p. 29. 
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ba::talion deployed in January 1985. Two rr.onths later, the 
battalion aC:'1ieved Pa::riot 's first initial overseas operat i on 
capabil i ty within United States Army Europe (USAREU~) . On 
April U, 1985, Patriot officially joined the North Atlantic 
Tr e aty Organization (NATO). 
Duri ng the saDe year, the Patriot Project Office 
draftee a Requirements Operation Capability (~OC) document Ear 
the Preplanned Production I rr.provement (P3I) Program and 
initiated the Rel iabil ity ane !'II..aintainability programs. The 
intent o f this P3 1 program was to develop the capability to 
counter :uture e lectronic counter measure. th r eats . 
J\n Anti - tactical :.1is8ile PAC - 2 Development COntract 
worth $S:,8l6,354 was awarded to Raytheon in August 198 6. 
August a lso signified the first deployment of PDB-l software 
outside the Continental United States (OCOl\llS) i n August, with 
Continental United States (CONUS) occurring the following 
month . 
On September 11, 1986, a Patriot missi le intercept red 
a lance missile during a flight test at White Sands Missile 
Range , Ne w Mexico. The i ntercept occurred a:: an altitude of 
7.6, 000 feet and eight miles dOW!'lrange from the Patriot 
launcher. J 2 
On March 3 1 , 1987, Patrio t conpletec negotiations 
with Raytheon for a firm , fixed-price , multi - year productioe 
3 2 T ice , ,Tim , 
Huntsvi ll e T~mes, 
2 l 
Missile Test SuccessEl:I" , 
The basis for this multi - year contract was the 
Multiyear Procurement Strategy, which was approved by the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition on October 19, 
1985, and Office of the Secretary of Defense during December 
1985. The $3 . 55 b:'ll i on contract, awarded in ~>arch 1986, 
represented the produc t ion cf the system from fiscal year 1981 
through 1987 . The contract called for the production of 15 
fire units and 4,491 missiles , in addition to the 77 fire 
units and 2,572. miss i les prcc'Jred from Raytheon in previous 
buys. )] 
With production stable, subsequent efforts focused 0:1 
support of the system. Facilities for re-certifying and 
refurbishing missiles became operational i:1 Auguf:lt and 
December 1987 . 34 
On March 17, 1988, the or:'ginal Anti tactical Missile 
Contract was modified to include a letter contract for Multi-
mode seeker guidance technology. The letter contract totaled 
a not - to - exceed ceiling amount of $5,800,000, making the tctal 
contract worth $57,616,354. 35 
3J"Despite Some Glitches, the System is Performing We l l in the 
Field", Military Logist:'cs Forum, November-December 1987, p. 46 . 
)"'''Defender (Patriot) Project Eistory" , Patriot Project Office 
Document , September 1993, p. 3. 
35"Historical ,,-epart", Patriot Project Office, October 1, 1987 
to September 30, 1988, p.3 . 
firing units t h rol:g:'1 the AN/TSQ - 7] Mi!';sile Minder Command and 
Contro l System. This software upgrade provided oe',; ~ edtures 
and ca?abilitie8 in cQuntermeas\:res, cQrrIDunications, computer 
processing, maintenance , and missile perfonnance, which 
included the initial anti - tact~cal missile engagement 
capability. An article in Research, Development, a:1d 
Acquisltlo:l (RD&A) Bulletin , titled "Life Cycle Software 
Engir:eering Cel:ters", cited the success of this software 
enh ancement: 
The original Patriot system was designed to engage hi g h 
performance aircraft. The capability of the system was 
subsequently expanded to include tactical ballistic 
missiles . The enhancements for improvil'.g capabilities 
included software programs at a cost: of $32 million. 
However, the cost of making the same improvements In 
hardware or procuring a new missile system was estir:tated 
to far exceed $32 million . 36 
The effe ctiveness of this integration was tested during Return 
of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) in 1988. 
After the successful completion of a series o[ 
confirmatory tests, a new vers ion of the ?atriot missile with 
improved anti-tactical missile capability was cut into 
production 1n December 1 988 . This program, known as the 
Patriot Advanced Capability-l (PAC - i) Missile Progra"ll, was a 
software - only modification that provided Patriot with a 
36 ·':.ife Cycle Software Engineering Cer.ters" , Arrw R:J and A 
~, November - December 1990, p. 28 . 
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limited self-defense against one class of TBMs37 . On 
December 1, 1988, the PAC-l program was completed. 
The Patriot Advanced Capability - 2 (PAC-2) Missile 
Program followed, with the first missile deployrnent occurring 
in September 1990, five months ahead of schedule. The 
accelerated deployment was the result of an extensive effort 
by the project manager . This key decision to accelerate the 
deployment resulted in the fielding of the first PAC - 2 
missiles to Desert Shield and provided Patriot units in Saudi 
Arabia the capability to counter Scud missile attacks in 
J anuary 1991. Additional decisions to accelerate the PAC - 2 
missile production occurred as the events of Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm unfolded . 38 In September 1990, the President 
directed Foreign r-!ilitary Sales (FMS) of Patriot systems to 
Israel; another FHS agreement with Saudi Arabia was reached 
two months la ter. 
July 1992 marked many significant events in the 
Patriot proj ect. These events included a Patriot Advanced 
capability (PAC III) Operat:.ion Requirements Document, the PDB-
3 Quick Response Program software release, a Radar Snhancement 
Phase II production decision (MS III) approval, and a Quick 
Response Program (QRP) production decision (MS III) approval. 
37weeks , Paul, "The St:.ory of Patriot", Air Defense Art i~ 
~, Jan 1993, p. 40. 
38 r'Defender (Patriot) Pr.oject History", Patriot Project 
Office, September 1993 , p. 4. 
D. HOW THIS STRATEGY IS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED I N THE PATRIOT 
'T'ociay's 3cquisition strategy Eor PaLriot i s to conLinue to 
provide a base l ine system capable of counter::'ng the evolving 
threat, while m.i nimizing technological risks and enhancing 
system c3pability through p l anned upgrades of deployed 
systems . 39 
1'0 achieve these goals, the Patriot program has 
incorporated two interrelated programs, the Patriot Growth 
Program anci the Patriot Advanced Capability - 3 {PAC - 3} Pr:."Jgram . 
'rhe Patriot Growth Program is based on a:1 evolutionary 
strategy that consists of a series of preplanned producl 
improvf>ments (P3 I) and enhancements derived from the 
Reliability , lI.vailabiliLy, and Maintainability (R1\M) Growth 
Program. 'T'his acquisition strate gy includes an inte,lt to 
.mi nimize the time and cost of satisfying an identified, 
validated need consistent with comIllon sense, seund business 
practices and the basic policies established by DoD Directive 
5000 . 1, Defense lI.cquisiti::m. ,,40 The Patriot Growth 
Program's prir'lary goal is to recover lost battle space. The 
Growth Program will enabl e the Patriot system LO counter 
ste alth aircraft, low-altitude cruise rr.issiles, high velocity 
, "Acquisi t ien Stra.tegy for Patriot Program", Patriot 
Proj e ct Office Document, September 1993, p. 2. 
40l.hi.d., p. 8. 
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tactical ballistic missile (TBMs), and defeat enemy High Value 
Airborne Assets (HVAA) , such as Airborne warning and Control 
System (AWACS), t<.econnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition 
Aircraft (rt.STA), Stand Oft Jammers (SOJ) , 
and Tankers (See l<igure 2-1). 
Figure 2-1 Patriot Growth 
PATJUOT GROWTH RECOVERS 
Inn '!Am Ii SPACE 
• DeftoI ..... """V ... ...-...A ... u(lfVM) 
(,O.WACS.IlSTA.5OI,nn>rn) 
Source : Patriot Pro ject Ott ice, Septerr.ber 1993 
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Pat riet Advanced Capabi l ity Pru gram-) (PAC-3), 
subcompone nt of t he Patriot G!:owth PrcgrClm, is a newl y 
developed program designeci t o reduce the techn810gical 
advancement effered by t hese systems . PAC-) is divided in t o 
fOl..ir configl.Ora l iens that. are managed as ACAT III programs at 
the program executive efficer leve l . 
requirements def ined the Operational 
R!"quirements Dec'-lment for the Patriet Advanced Capability 
(PAC - 3) program, the PCltriot Project Office proposed six, 
interrelated areas for improvement : 
Detec t. i::)Il and engagement of lower observable targets . 
The th!:eat includes lower observable TBMs and aircraf t 
flying in clutter and/or intense electronic 
countermeasures (ECG) environments. 
Positive identification/classificat i on of a~r 
breathing t.hn~ats (ABTs) and TBMs . PAC - 3 m'-lst be able 
to positively identi fy and/er classify/categorize MTs 
Clnd TBKs. Additionally, PAC - 3 must discriminate 
between valid targets and penetration aids or debris. 
Increased firepower and lethality. PAC-3 must 
increase multiple sinrJ.ltaneous engagement and t rack. 
handling, improve letha l ity against a more stressing 
target and decrease miss ile reload times. 
Survivability. Patriot upgrades mast counter the 
growing lethality of the modern battlefield and 
adva:1ces in cnemy recognizance, surve:'..llance and 
target acquisition (RSTA) . 
j7orc~ syn c hronizat i on integration. Patriot 
opera:.e with other bat tlefield operatiny- syst.ems 
and have ccmpatibility with future Army, Jo int 
Ccmbincd Services command, control, cOmr.lunica tions , 
and intelligence (C3I) architectures. 
27 
Extended Range. Patriot must operate at extended 
rages to disrupt enemy use of airspace. 41 
The Growth Program groups the system modifications into 
configurations that are scheduled for fielding in the same 
time - frame (See Table 2 - 1). These configuration groupings 
include block changes to the hardware and software. 
Incremental increases in performance will be determined for 
each configuration, which will serve as benchmarks for 
configuration testing and user doctrine and tactics 
development. 42 According to the Deputy Proj ect Manager, 
approximately 20 significant modifications will be developed 
and applied to the system over the next five to six years, 
totaling more than $2 billion in Research, Development, Test 
and Evaluation, (RDT&E) and production . 43 The modifications 
to the system are discussed at length in Chapter III of this 
thesis. 
4l.D;;;id., p. 2. 
42ThiQ. 
4301dacre, A.Q., ' I mplementation of Integrated Product Teams 
1n the Patriot Project Office, Patriot Project Office Document, 
September 1993, p. 1. 
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TABLE 2-~ CONFIGURAT ION GROUPINGS FOR pA-TarOT MODI:?I CATIONS 
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Pending a favorable Milestone Review in February 1994, the 
Fatriot p~oject will enter an Engineering and Development 
Phase during the second quarter of fiscal year 1994. The 
:cemainder of the year will integrate system performance 
demonstrations, which will occur after r.ardware and software 
~esting, and will culminate in EMD flight tests against 
electronic counter measure emi tting threat targe~s. 44 EMD 
will include an in - process review for entry into limited rate 
initial p:coduction (LRI P). EMD will be followed by a 
Milestone III decision, which will allow the projec~ to 
proceed into the p:coduction and deployment of the ?AC- 3 
missile . 
E. ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION/PREPLANNED 
PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT STRATEGY USED IN THE PATRIOT WEAPON 
SYSTEM IN TERMS OF COST, PERFORMANCE, AND SCHEDULE 
The evolutionary acquisition strategy and the preplanned 
product improvement st:categy were the approaches employed to 
ensure the success of this proj ect . When the concept for 
Fatriot was first defined in the 1960's, the system was 
specifically designed to destroy high performance, air-
breathing targets. This strategy allowed the air defense 
community to field the core capability of the system, while 
allowing the capability for future system upgrades. AS the 
44"ACquisition St~ategy for ?atriot Program" , Patriot Proj ect 
Office, September 1993, p . 14 . 
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technol:Jgy, in terms Of hardware and f;oftware, became 
available, the prO~\lc.t manager 8ubRequently re examined the 
operational capabil i tics of the system t o determine how the 
Patriot mi ssile ~ould be designed to counter Lhe growing 
tactical bal l ist.ic missile threat . 
II: terms of cost, schedule, and performance, there is no 
denying t:he fact that the pro j ect: suffered "growing pains" 
, ... hile establishi.ng its learning cu~e . Many Goverr..ment: 
oftic.ials were quick to point out: that initial cost estimates, 
especial l y those determined during the limited prod u ction 
phase of the proj eot, nearly doubled the estimates established 
at the inception of the project:. Early problem areas alsc 
included several schedu l ing gaps due ~o pr:oduction . l\notheT 
f actor contributing to schedule and perforw.ance problems in 
system reliabil ity was deficiencies in the main~enance 
software used for diagnOSing tailures w i~hin the system. 
These proble:ns, however . were corrected through the dedicated 
efforts of the project manager and the contractor. 
An acquisition assessment of ~he Pacriot Project was 
sununed up heRt in a letteT written hy Colonel Bruce M. 
GaTnett, in response to an article published in a Ju l y 1989 
erl.it: .ion of N:ilitary Forum magazine . 45 Colonel Garnect, the 
Patriot Project Manager from 1987 to 1991, made the following 
Colonel Bruce M. , Response to Peter Grier's 
Service Buys Best?", Mi l it a ry FOHlIl] , July 1989, pp . 
3l 
key points concerning cost, schedule, and performance of the 
system: 
Patriot ground equipment showed re liability levels 
that were more than twice the specified requi:::-ements 
for both production and operational field test (see 
Table 2-1). 
The IT.ultiyear contract for Patriot represen t ed a major 
milestone for l\rmy Acquisition and perhaps a model for 
all services. The multiyear contract result_ed in a 
savings of over $445 million, whi le providing a 
complete level of program stability. 
Production aggressive preplanned product improvements 
(P3I) and reliability, availability and 
maintainability growth programs were on time and under 
cost: . 
Aft er receiving a directive to develop, test, and 
demonstrate an effective conunand post, this task was 
accomplished within twelve months. 
The PAC missile program was put into production and 
fielded at fifty percent of the originally projected 
cost, on schedule and exceeding all initial technical 
capability projections. 46 
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TABLE 2-1 PATRI OT RELIABIL I TY 
MEAN TIME BETWEEN fAILURE [MTBf) 
"I 
"I 
:: t' ""°t/~~ ]j 
JD __ _ GOdl 29 ~~uri 
20 
"i ;----------------------
f.4AR 9S JAN 93 
T I f.4 E 
Source : Pat. r i.ot. Proj ect. Office Briefing, Sept. eMber 1993 
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III. PATRIOT SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
PURPOSE OF CHAPTER 
This chapter will examine the mission of the Patriot air 
defense system. It will include a decription of the 
components of the system, a discussion of the major 
contractors and subcontractors for the system, and the 
strategy used by the Patriot Project Manager to handle the 
evolving threat. 
MISSION OF PATRIOT 
In Apri l 19 84, Field Manual 44 - 15, titled Patriot 
Battalion Operations, defined the mission of Pa triot as 
providing "very low to very high-altitude air defense of high 
value assets and grou!1d combat forces . The Air Defense 
communi ty has redef ined Patriot as: 
.a high -to-medium altitude, long -range air defense 
missile system which provides air defense of ground combat 
forces and high-value assets against the air threat of the 
1980 s and 1990s . 47 
Patriot is designed to cope with enemy defense suppression 
tactics which may include saturation, manuever, and electronic 
46 FM 44 - 15, Patriot Battalion Operations, 1984, p. 1 -4. 
4700cument generated by the Patriot Project Cffice, 
Huntsvill e, AI~, t itled "Patriot", Dec 1991., p. 2. 
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cour_te:::rr.easures (ECM: _ Its phased array ::-ada::- allows the 
systerr. 7.0 ;ointll tor:eous I y engoge ond destroy mul ::iple targets 
at vi'_ryinS ril..nges. Ln Goo~d' r.3. t i on wi ~h sho.:::"l range, low 
allilud", turwc.nl areC. :.ieter:;;c ·.."cO-puns O-nd ot:1.er J:::-ound O-:1d c:.i::: 
assets, Pa:.rio:. w~ll provirie :,:J.e l:eGeSi3i'_ry il..i T :i",te l1se fo::-
the thea leI' cE opera~ions. 18 
SYSTEM COMPONENTS AND CONFIGURATION 
Pil..triot, a $13 billi::m pllls progril..m, is Gredited as havir..g 
:he largesl fieldicg in L1e hit=lury uf th'" ::-.8. Army Ma~eriel 
Co:runand (A..VICj. T:1.e syste:n '--r.c~udes (;572 [[.issiles, over- 8lJ,UlJU 
major- e:1c. ite[[.:;, 2S0,aoo~ spO-res, tool;;, O-nd test, 
measurerctent and diagnostic equiprctenl {'T':\ID,,: fiO,OOO+ 
pub~icCltio:1s, Clr.d is ;;uppo:::-ted by over -;, :'00 ;;oldicrs. ,,9 
A ?a7_~iot cattal iO:1 GOl:sis7_S or a ~"'ar1qllart.,.rs and 
:1.eadgUOl-r:.eri:1 battery a:lc. six firing batteriei:1. The firi:l9" 
balleries 0::: fi:::i:1g units can :Oe cor.trol~ed by the battalion 
or fight ir. Cl:1 outcnCmotlS r:1cde. The major end iterr.s of ::he 
tiri r.g uni tar", t:1e ~ada::- set, the en9"agercten~ control i3tat i on 
(.:o:C'S), eight launching stOl-ti::m (LS: :nissiles, the eLectric 
power plant (F.?P) , ac:_enna :nasl groLlp (;r>.'4S:, and ~he 
Inform<:..ti,x_ Centrol Cente::.- (ICC: (See ?iqure 3-:':. 
4il Ih id. 
is coctClinec. ir: 
:?a~riot:" OIl Apri 
Fatriot Pruj ",cl Crfice 
1.993. 
Figure 3-1 Patriot System Configuration 
Source: p.atriot Project Office, September 1993 
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Radar Set 
The raear set cor-sists of a single, mul::.ifuYlctioYl, 
phased - ar:::-ay antenna wi th electronic beam steering, w.'1 i. cn 
performs the t unctioYls of search, deteccion, identif i cation, 
t rac k ing, and target i llumi nat i on, and is a l so responsibl e for 
the issuance of guidance cOll'mands to t h e missile. The radar 
c<ln simu l taneo·els l y track up to 50 tnxge t s and handl e 'elf to 
five simultanecus engagements at a range of 37 Ylaut i cu. l 
miles. 50 Other features include adaptive ECCM cap<lbality and 
an advanced signal processo:::- . 
2. Engagement Control Station 
The Engage:nent Cor..trol Stilt ion (ECS) p:!"ovides the fire 
direction control at the battery level . It consists ef the 
weapons cont:::-ol co:npuLer (wee), disp l ay and cent:::-ol g:::-oup, 
three UHF radio ternir..a.ls, a VHF' dilta link terminal (OL":' ) , and 
t we VHF voice radios. 51 The wce provides the informaLion 
necessary for oOll1.'nand and control, ta r ge t identif ication, 
tracki n g ilnd intercept, and battle managerr.ent . 
3. Launching Station 
The l aunching stiltion responsibl e for the 
transport, aim, and launch at tour fu l ly self-conta ined 
miss i les. It a l so receives, decodes, and executes com.""T.Clnds 
SOpatriQt Pro j ect Office Document, "Memories", July 1990, 
p. 7. 
S:FM ';4 -15 , "P<l t. riot Battali oY! CperaLicr..s ', April 1984, p. 3-
6. 
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from the :::CS and communicates status reports to the ECS . 52 
The Patriot Quick Response Program (QRPj wi ll enable the 
launching station to be remote l y emplaced up to 1.0 kilometers 
from the 3CS . This · ... i l l be accomplished primarily thorough 
software modifications, resulting in an increased tactical 
ballistic missile defense and a reduction in visua l signature 
upon missile firings . 53 
A schematic representation of the interactions of the 
launching station, Engagement Control Station, a:1d radar set 
is provided in Figure 3 - 2 . 
4. PAC-3 Missile 
The Patriot project manager considered three 
approaches for the PAC- 3 missile program . One consideration 
for the prograr:! was the multimode missi l e, which serves a two-
fold purpose: first, the mu l timode missile is designed to 
buy back battespace against reduced cross section, air 
breathing threats; and second, this missi l e effectivel y 
increases the tactical bal l istic missile footprint t o protect 
assets within a larger area. 
52 FM 44 -1 5, "Patriot Batt.alion Operations" April 19 84, pp . 3 -
33patriot Project Office Briefing, "The Patriot Growth Program 





I I, . ~ 
; j ; 
I j ~ . j i 
I JI1J 
Figure 3-2 Patr':o"t Fire Operat i ons 
Source: Patr i ot Project Septembec 1993 
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Besides the longer range capability, other characteristics of 
this missile include an extended warhead proximity kill zone, 
and an active seeker, which does not require the radar's 
illumina tion waveform. 54 
A second consideration for the PAC-3 missile program 
was Loral Vought's Extended Range Interceptor (ERIN'l') missile. 
The ERINT missile is known as a hit-to-kill missile. It is 
considerably smaller than the Multimode missile. In fact, its 
size wil l permit a total of sixteen missiles per launcher vice 
four f or the Multimode. 
The third consideration included one of the following 
three options: a mix of ERIl'.'T and existing Patriot missiles; 
a mix of Mu l timode and exis ting Patriot missiles, and a mix of 
ERINT, Multimode, and existing missi l es. According to the the 
Patriot Project Office, the third alternative will be 
considered " ... only if neither the Multirr.ode nor ERINT can 
singularly satisfy the ORD requirement and the Mul timode/ERINT 
comb i nation is determined to be cost effective. "55 
In February 1994, the Army reconunended the ERINT missile 
over the Multimode as i ts PAC-3 missi le . This decision was 
protested by Representative Peter Torkildsen (R-Mass.), who 
charged the Army with "not abiding by its requirements 
54Weeks, Paul, "The Story of Patriot," ~~, 
p. 42. 
55.I.Qi.d ., p. H. 
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criteria during the se l ection of the ER:NT missile . " 56 The 
De f e nse Acquisition Board will cons':'der both systems on April 
21, 19 94. 57 
CONTRACTOR/MAJOR SUBCONTRACTORS FOR PATRIOT 
The prime contractcr for t !1e "at riot system is Lhe 
Raytheon Co:npany, Bedford, Massachuset ts. The Patriot I'roj ect 
Office refers to Raytheon as "thl! onl y contractor possess i ng 
t:"1e required Patriot experience, expertise, ar.d knowledge 
necesssary to integrate system improvements into the PatTiot 
system" . 5a This relat':'onship dates Dack to 1967, when the 
development contract 'Has competitively awarded t .C :i<aytheon , 
whc s ubsequently produced the missile and serves as the 
integrat i ng cor.tractor. 59 The maj or subcontractors for th e 
system include the Martin Marietta Corporation, Or l ando, 
Fl orida, and Thio:<:ol Chemical Corporation, Huntsvi l le, 
l\ l abama . Martin Marietta is responsih l e for the missile and 
launcher asse:nt: l y, with the so l id roc '<:et IT.otor produce d by 
Thiokol. Other subcon t ractors include C"1amberlain (warhead) , 
rJucas ( launcheTs components) , Valley (D UTI'-l cabinet: , Brunswick 
56"l\rrny TgYlOTed ORO in PAC - 3 
Veutch" Aerospace Daily, March 9, 1994, p. 
Torkildsen Te l l s 
DAB Sec; -For Apri:_ 21", 
fer Patriot Program, " Pa tTiot PToj eCt 
p. 7.3 . 
59 I b i Q.. 
(radome billet), and Emerson Electronics (power supplies) . 
A total o~ eleven other subcontractors contribute to ~he 
production of the Patriot weapon system. 
E. PATRIOT ADVANCED CAPABILITY (PAC) PROGRAMS 
A major strategy within the Patriot Evolutionary 
Acquisition approach has been the development and e xecution of 
the Pat :dot Anti -Tactical Missile Capability (PAC) Programs. 
The purpose of the PAC programs was to provide a baseline 
system capable of being mod~_ ":ied to cope with the evolving 
threat . 60 This issue was f__ addressed i n 1983 during a 
meeting between the project manager, Brigadier General Max 
Bunyard, and his replacement, Brigadier General Donald 
Infante. Their discussion focused on how Patriot cOl..i.ld combat 
the growing threat, and how quickly this threat could be 
addressed. 61 
This session marked the beginning of the PAC - l and PAC -2 
programs. The initial anti-missi le capability was fi rst 
developed in 1988. The PAC - l consisted of a software - only 
modification, whi ch enabled a limited - defense capability 
against one c lass of tactical ballistic missiles . PAC - 2 was 
developed in 1990 and offered an improved self · defense 
60 "Acquisition Strategy for Patriot Program", Patriot Project 
Office Docl..i.ment, September 1993, p . 2. 
61weeks, Paul, "The Story of Patriot", Air Defense Ar+- illery 
Yearbook, January 1993, p. 40. 
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capability with the followir.g enhancements : a new missi:e 
war-h ea:::! , <:In upgraded dual fuze , and appropriate soft'N'are 
changes 
intercept. 62 
1.mprove t:J€ nissile's tra jectory durinq 
The PAC-3 seeks to improve upon the capabilities of the 
existing system. The Patriot o ffic:e defines the FAC":-3 program 
... a corrbina tion of integrated complerr.entary system 
improvements" . 63 The improvenenLs lnval ve a ll'lmber of 
upgrades to existing system capabilities whL..:h include remote 
launch, intergration between the battalion tactical opera t ions 
center and t;,e i.nformation contr-ol center, radar- e nha'!lcements, 
an e:nhedded data rE"corder in the 3WCC:, and comlm . :.nicaticn 
upgrades. 
ANALYSIS OF THE PAC PROGRAMS 
The Patriot Advanced Capability Programs I and II have 
been very successful . The key to this success i s the 
synchrcnizat i on of system impr-ove~ents to both haydware and 
software . In terms of software, updates dye schedul ed at: 
regular intervals . These updates, which include software only 
program improv ements and hardware related software changes, 
are grouped i:1 Post Deployment Builds (PDB) that are .::-eleased 
to deployed units t:iannU<llly. 
63"The State of Pdtr-iot", Pa triot Project Office Briefing, 
Sepcernber 1993. 
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A measure of Patriot's success has heen the ability of the 
Pro ject Office to upgrade the system in order to keep pace 
with the changing threat . The PAC-3 program wil l resu l t in a 
number of improvements to a number of system end - items. 
Projected improvements include an upgraded computer system 
within the EWCC van . Radar upgrades wil l include improvements 
in target acquisition and tracking, anti - tactical missile 
engagement capability, increased target identification 
capability , and ease in emplacing the system. The PAC - 3 
program will also increase the lethality o f the system through 
upgrades to the multimode or ERINT missile. The bottom line 
with the PAC - ) program is this: PAC-3 will provide increased 
performance and capability to counter the technological 
developments of enemy ba l listic and tactical missiles . 
PATRIOT'S CONTRIBU'l'ION IN DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM 
A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER 
This chapter wi l l examine the perforrr.ance of the Patriot 
weapon syste m in the D~sert Shie l d/Desert Stann cont.l ict . I t 
will address issues concern i ng the effectiv~n~ss o f the 
weapons system in acqu i ring, tracking, and engaging Scud 
missi l es, analysis of its e ff e ctiveness against Scud missiles, 
and how the Patriot Proj ect manager has incorporated the 
::'essons .L earned tram Desert Stonn into the program . 
DEPLOYMENT 
The decision to dep l oy the Patr i ot system to Southwest 
Asia was in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 
2, 1990. The Patriot battalions deployed were part of the 
11th Air Def ens e Arti l l ery, Brigade, Fort Bl iss, ':'exas. These 
units, along with Avenge r fir e units and crews tram the 6th 
KJA Bri gade, Fort !3J iss, Texas, were airlifted by C- 5 Galaxies 
and C- 141 StarT,ifters62 [See Table 4~1}. 
62case , Blair, "A Line Drawn in the Sand," Air De~ 
Artillery Mrwaz i ne, Sep - Oct 1990, p. 23. 
TABLE .; -1 ~ AiJA DEPLOYMENT 
1 st Cavalry Division 
2nd Armored Division 




11th ADA Brigade 
2nd SMalien. 1 S( ADA 
~<!.wk) 
2.~a 8allaiicn. it., ADA 
(Patrlor) 
3ra 8ar.ai ion. 43th ADA 
(Pauiot) 
5t1'1 8attaJicn. 62:'10 ACA 
(p~trlct) 
6th ADA Brigade 
24th In! Div (Meeh) 
<lin 3aitaJiCr. Sin ADA 
\VUiC2IliS;ir.gerJ 
82nd Airborne Division 
3rc 8attalicn, ~th AOA 
(VUIC2ll/Stin:;er) 
101 st Airborne Div (AA) 
197th Infantry Brigade 
·,'D.l ....... ~."'n .... 
"'"""" .. OI~ec_lS'" 
~UI""""'5. '990 
Sau:;:'ce.; Air ;:)efense Arcillery Magazine. 
SepC2ffiDer - Oc Cabe r 1990 
The Patriot fire units were initially deployed to protect 
ai rfie lds f ar sout h o f the Kuwaiti border. About 60 Patr i ot 
launchers were positioned in Saudi Arabia, with t he primary 
missions against t heater and tactical ballistic missiles 
(TBMs) and any Iraqi aircraft that might be confirmed by 
satellite reconnaissance as carrying c hemical weapons. 63 
Follow-on deployments inc luded t he defense of the Isreali 
cities of Tel Aviv and Haifa. The TBM threat was thought to 
6]"Army's Pat:::::-ioc; :-rig!". Tech Supe:rstar 0:: Jese=t StO!:1l1 ". 
Ar;nv, March 199::', p. 40. 
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cons i st of Soviet- bu i l t Sc ud B missiles, which del iver~ a 
2,172 - pound warhead, and an enhCln ced v ersi on of th i s missi l e, 
known as the Al Eusse i n, wh i ch is capable o f de: i vering a 
3,28 1 - pOllnd warhead . 64 'I':"1ese l ong-range missiles 
capabl e of l1 it ':: ing Largets deep inside Saudi Arabia . 6') 
At t he time of the depl oyment, the proj ect manager made a 
key program decis i on which L: l timately i n fluen c ed the overal l 
effecliveness or ?atrio t in t he Desert Storm c onflict. At L"1e 
t ime of th!": Iraqi invasion, t_ he f ie .lding of t_ he Pl\C-?' missi l e 
was scheduled tc occur a t least six months af t er the 
dep lo yment o ~ its enabling scftware packa.ge known as PD3 - 3 
(Po s t Depl oyment B"J.ild) . 66 'I'h!": PAC - 2 miss ile is an imprcved 
v e rsion of PAC - l . Both mi ss i les have warheads that are 
re lativ ely the same size, but the PAC - 2 boasts imp r c v ements in 
the s i z e of ch e f ragment and the v elocity and spray pattern 
needed fo!:' a high l ethality kill.67 Eased on the 
capab ilities of t he PJ\C - 2 missile, the p roject :nar:ager pushed 
Raytheon to compress the missile production ramp - up schedu le, 
whi c h acce l erated the full capabili t y deployment date to 





T:"1e Story of Patriot, A::'r Defens e Artil lery 
p. 41 . 
January 1991. T~is decision enabled the Patriot system 
de~eat Iraqi Scuds with the best IT.issile available. 69 
C. PATRIOT ENGAGEMENT AGAINST SCUD MISSILE ATTACKS 
The actual speed of the Patriot missi l e is classified. 
The March 1991 issue of Army Magazine lists the unofficial 
speed at which a Patriot missile exits the liluncher at Mach 3, 
accelerating to a speed of Mach 6 at intercept . 69 The 
incoming speed of an Iraqi-modified Scud missile, in 
comparison, is approximately Mach 4.75. 
The historic first intercept of a Scud missile occurred on 
January 17, 1991, when A Battery, 2 -7 ADA, engaged a target in 
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Most of the intercepts occurred at 
ranges of 1'0 miles or less, with the acquisition of the Scud 
missiles occurring at ranges of 35 to 50 mIles. 7» Within 
days, a total of 33 Scuds were engaged . 
D. ANALYSIS OF PATRIOT'S PERFORMANCE IN DESERT SHIELD/DESERT 
STORM 
The per~ormance of Patriot in Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
was scrutinized Intense l y in the months fo l lowing the war. 
The A!:11".y dec l ared the official success rate at more than 80 
6a~. p.41. 
69"A:r:my's Patriot: High-Tech Superstar of Desert Storm," l1!::8y, 
Mar 1991 , p. 41. 
70.ll!...l..Q. 
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percent.- in Saudi Ar abia and m~:JI: e than 5 0 percent in I srael . 71 
Theses figures were later revised t o 70 peycent ar.d 4 0 percent: 
respect i vely. 
However, a IlUlpbF'r o f reports were publ i shed which 
questioned the e:fectiveness of the Patrio t weapon systF'm. A 
report publiS:"led by th e General Accounting Office on September 
33 , 1992. contends that "data does not exist to concl usively 
say how well Palriot performed. ,,72 ThF' report was generated 
by Congressr:1an John Conyers, Jr . Chairman of the Legislation 
and National Security Subc::mlmittee, Corrunittee on G8vernment 
Operations, and CongreS STIla:1 Frank Horton, the ranking minority 
member, and was in response a hearing held before the same 
subcorrunittee on April 7, 199 2. During this hearing, the 
Directo r of Army Issues, General Accounting Off ice, t e !:;tiiie d 
before the SUbC8I'.1ITlittee that the Project Manager's claim!:; of 
the Patri8t' s success during Operation Desert Storm were not: 
supported by the data. 73 The report state!:; t:"lat "the Anry 
had also recogni7. e d t he limitations of its assessment, and a 
few days p r i or 
Fe b 
reason!:;, 
ach:'ev i ng 
systRm i s 
the Subcomrnittee's hear i ngs, the Army 
Proud", Air Defense Artillery, Jan -
classified, tor nati.onal security 
that Patriot .is credited with 
72Ger.eral Accounting Office, 
STORM; Data Does C\:ot Exist 
~erformed" U.S. Goveynment 22, 
73J..Q...l..Q. p. 1. 
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hearings, the Army revised i t s assessment. ,,74 The review of 
avai l able background information revea l ed that: 
• Aithough tr.c Patriot was nOt originally designed to e ngage 
an exte:1ded range, high· speed bal l istic missile, the Army 
quickly incorporated changes to provide the Pa t r i ot with 
this capability . The Army and t1'.e prime contractor, i n 
coordination with the intel l igence community, identified, 
assesse d, and incorporated s oftware modifications to 
provide the Patriot the capabiiity to engage the faster 
missiles. 
• At the time of the Iraqi invas ion, on l y three PAC · 2 
mi s si l e s were in t he Army ' s inven tory. By the end of the 
month , 600 improve d Patriot missil es were depl oye d t o 
Southwest Asia. 
• The Patriot missi l e does not have to hit the e nemy warhead 
in order to destroy it. Each Patriot missi l e contains a 
fuze, which senses the presence of a target , and a warhead 
wi t r. (l) me t al fragments to destroy or disable the target 
and (2) an explosive to propel the fragments to the 
t arget . When the Patriot mi ssi l e flies close enough to 
the target to cause the Patriot's fuze to issue a 
detonation order, the fragments are propelled at high 
velocity toward the t arget . ":'he Patriot fragments that do 
not cause the target's warhead to explode can damage the 
warhead to the extent that it will eithe!: not explode or 
will not explode with full force when it hi::s the ground 
or will go off course. 75 
The report states that the Army did :1ot collect 
performance da t a since Patriot was operating in a war z one and 
not on a test range. Under test range conditions, the 
performance of the Patriot system could be recorded with high · 
speed photographic equipment, portable data recorders, and 
telemet!:y equipment. During Desert Storm, with the not abl e 
74~. 
751..!2iQ . , p. 2. 
50 
exception of d<J.ta recorde::s tha::: cap::ured a few er.gagemen::s in 
Israel, there was not the means to evaluate t he exact m.:mber 
of targets that WE're kil l e d. 76 
The report fu::ther conten:is tha t Patriot computers 
processed carget inforrr.ation thac was sometimes prese r.ved on 
tape or i:1 hard copy . 77 This info rma tion, however, oa:mot 
be ":.lseu to determine whetber the warhead of ::he Scud was 
destroyeu during inte::cept. The intor.nation often included 
the fol l owing: 
• '"hen the Patriot system de tec ted a target; 
the target detected by the system met 
of t he modified Scud, 2,000 to 2,200 
• Whethe r the system, or the system' 8 operator, had 
determined target would impact an asset oeing 
protected by Patrio t and launched Patriot missiles 
toward the tars:e::, a:1d 
• Whether the Patriot 
killed or failed to 
The Patriot Office offers an interestir.g parad igm :::hey 
ca l l "The Patriot/Scud Ground Damage Paradox" (Sec Figure 
4-1) . T;'lis model states Chat scientifical ly there was a 
limiced value lev el of data, from which one could 
that either Patriot did i::s job, or Patriot didn't do itG 
7&.lb..iQ ., p. 3. 
77.I.QiQ. p. 'i. 
78.;l.Q.i.Q,!J. 5 . 
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job".79 The paradox centers on the fac~ that there were a 
number of aerial explosions which occurred as l'atriots 
':'ntercepted Scud missiles, with no report e d ground damage 
during operation Desert Stor:n. This implies tha~ warheads 
must have been destroyed by Patriot missile intercepts, since 
warheads that are not destroyed in the air would result in 
significant ground damage. 
Dr . Peter Zimmerman, a physicist and exper~ in imagery 
analyst at the independent Center for Strateg=-c and 
:;:nternational Studies in washington, D.C., offered this 
perspective of the "Patriot/Scud Ground Damage Paradox". In 
his ~estimony before the House Goverrunent Operations 
Commi~tee, Dr. Zimmerman stated that : 
The only way to know (Patriot's effectiveness) is to look 
at the ground. Patriot reduced the damage expectancy from 
one-and-a-half to four in Israel. This is absolutely not 
the performance of a system that failed . I believe the 
Patriot system was an astounding success, even if it only 
cut in half the severe damage that migh~ have been 
otherwise produced by the Scuds. Patriot was used to 
defend against a threa~ well beyond the outer edge of its 
original design envelope, and it frequently succeeded. ;;'or 
the first time in history ba l listic missiles launched in 
combat were countered by defending interceptors. That's 
important. We need to push ahead wi th research and 
deve l opment for advanced tactical ballistic missile 
defenses . 80 
73 "Desert Shield/Desert Storm Observations and Lessons 
Learned", Patriot l'roject Office Briefing, March 13, 1991, p. 4. 
80Stone, Michael P.W., "Closing the Patriot Controversy", &i.:r;: 
Defense Artil~, January - February 1993, p. 27. 
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Figure 4- 1 The Patriot/Scud Ground Damage Paradox 
Source: Fatr iot Proj ect Of f ice, March 1991 
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In an analysis of hew effectively Patriot performed during 
the Oeser:: Storm conflict, the former Secretary of the Army, 
Michael P."'o1 . Stone, offered the following observaticns: 
• On the strategic level, Patriot wa s an important factor i n 
the I sraeli decision to avoid a direct entry into the Gulf 
Har. 
• At the tactical level, Patriot accomplished a historic 
mission: successfully engaging, intercepting and killing 
incoming ballistic miss iles. 
• On the psychological l evel, Patriot provided a grea t 
mental lift fcr the Israelis, Americans and freedom - loving 
people around the world by demonstrating the effectiveness 
of the American technology. And most important , 
• On the r.uman level , the Pa::riot saved l ives. 91 
Overall, the Patriot: system p erformed well in Desert 
Storm . Desert Storm was a true operational t:es t of a system 
that had never fired a missile under actual wartime 
conditions. When analyzing Patriot's performance, 
important to ccnsider the following issues. First, Patriot 
was originally designed to defeat high performance aircraft 
only. The requirement for the system to counter a ballistic 
missi le threat was not seriously addressed until the 1980's. 
The flexible nature of an evolutionary st .categy and the 
Preplanned Product Improvemen t approach permitted the Project 
Ma nager to upg.cade his system as ne.w tec.l"ir:ologies were 
81.I..ill..d. , p. 28. 
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availab l e. The ::::-esu1:: was a missile system which possesse::i 
the capability t o defeat ba l listi c missiles . 
Second. t he Prc j ect lV'0nager was wil l.i ng tc tak:e a 
calculated risk:. He convinced Rayt~ecn to accelerat e the 
pruducticn of PAC-2 missi l es to .,nsure miss i les we :::::e deployed 
by ,Tanuary 1001. His decision allowed Patriot firing units to 
.,ngage Scud rr,issiles wi t h the best Patriot missile availabJe. 
This dec ision also symbolizes the i l'lportance of a stror:g 
Proj ect lV'0nager /Prime Contractor rela tionship. This 
Patriot/Raytheon "marriage" has l asted for nearly thirty years 
a:ld has cO:1tributed to the stability of tr:e project. 
Desert Storm prov::':led the Project lV'.:anager with a number of 
leiolsons learned. In the area of acquisition cont racti:lg, 0 00 
should publish a new acquisilion regulat::'on clause that 
addresses rapid wartime respO:lse . Contracts should inc l ude 
surge options t o facilitate increased produc::ion duri:19 
mobilization ar.d contractor support requirements in the 
Problems areas also i~lcluded maintaining adequate slockage 
level of spare par::s, procedures for returning parts, 
requireme:1t for improved test and training equiprr.e:lf_, and 
inadequate power required t o sust_a i n cont inuous operations. 
The project office's current strategy focuses on 
improving the system through the Quick: Response Program (QRP) . 
This program allows the Patriot Project lV'.anager to implement 
hardware a:1d software changes ·~o the sys::e:n and field these 
changes in an expedient manner. The specific hardware 
improvements include: radar and missile enhancements, 
upgraded communication system, a remote launch capabilit.y, and 
the addition of an embedded data recorder in the '",eapons 
Control Computer (liCC). Post Deployment Build (PDB) software 
versions wlll continue to be fielded every six months. This 
fielding approach should reduce the additional problems t.hat 
are often created when hardware and software changes are not 
properly integrated. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
DISCUSSION OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The evolutionary acquisition strategy used thr::mghout the 
litccycle of the Patriot project was employed success:ully. 
This strategy optimized both the efficiency and effectiveness 
of this systerr.' s acquisition , al l owing the p::C:Jject manager to 
field a core capabi l ity of the sy"tem whi l e pJ anning fo:: 
future upgrades. The result of the strategy is d weapon 
system that has evol ver. from a p l atfonn tho.t was originally 
~esigned to defeat high perforrnance, air breathing aircratt to 
a system w:'lich currently is the only fielded system with a 
capabi l ity of engaging tactica l bal l istic missiles. 
The Preplanned Product Improvement (P3 I ) strategy 
instrumental in al l owing this system to evolve and count:er a 
dynamic threat environment. The Patriot Weapon System's anti-
bal l istic missile capabi l ity offers a good example of P3 I in 
action. 
In terms of the lessons learned from Patriot's involvement 
Desert St8rm, the major modi f ication to the acquisition 
strategy of the Patriot project was the developrr.eat of the 
Quick Reaction Progrrun. T:"1is program a l lows the Patriot 
Project Manager to implement ~ardware and software changes to 
the system a:ld :ield these changes in an expedient fashicr .. 
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In a sense, it serves to streamline the process by allowing 
the authorization for these decisions to occur at the Program 
Executive Officer leve l . 
A number of lessons learned from the Patriot Project that 
can be applied to future missile systems. These lessons 
learned are listed below. 
Define the requirements first. After the requirements for 
the system are thoroughly defined, the acquisition strategy 
should vigorously examine what actions are neccessary to 
upgrade the system to meet the technological advances of the 
threat. 
Tailor the acquisition strategy to fit the project. The 
Patriot Project's acquisition strategy incorporated elements 
of an evolutionary acquisition strategy plus a P3I approach. 
This tailoring of strategy al l ows the Project Manager to 
incorporate new technologies into t:he system to counter the 
technological advances in enemy threat capabilit:ies. 
Develop a strong working relationship between the Project 
Manager and the Prime Contractor. It is imperative that 
strong communications exist between the prolect office and the 
The Patriot/Raytheon marriage. wh:i ch has existed 
for nearly 30 years, has produced an u:1precedented project 
stability. The c l ose coordination between the Patriot Project 
Manager and Raytheon also contributed toward lowering defense 
cOSts, with fire ucit deliveries that were under cost and 011-
schedule. 
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Consider using a multiyear procurement contract. 
mult:iyear !Jrccurement: could resu l t i n significant 
reductions in the l ife - cycle of a project . In t:he Patriot 
project, "a 7 - year, multiyear procurement contract netted a 
total sav ings of over $445 million . ,,82 
Incorporate surge and wartime support provi sions in 
contracts. ContraCts sho'-ll d include surge options for 
::'ncreaseci production during mobilization. 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER PATRIOT SYSTEM RELATED RESEARCH 
There are a nll ~nber areas within the Patriot proje::; t that 
are candid<ltcs for further research. Sever<ll r:otent ial topics 
a :ce listed below. 
How can Patriot and Theater High Altitude Air Defense 
system (THAADS) be integrated? Thi s topic oO:lld explore the 
integration of Patriot with l'HAADS, an air ciefense s ystetrl 
wh:'ch i s patterned after the Patrio t and will increase the 
engagement capabili ty of t he system. 
How should a future Patriot Advanced Capability Program be 
configured? PlClns c'-lrrently cal l for a PAC - 4 program in the 
yeClr 2001. F'-lr t her. res eClrch could inc l ude cl camp!:'ehensive 
ex amination of the ef fectiveness of r:revious PAC progr<lms , and 
Co l one l Bruce M. Response to 
Service Buys 3est?", Military Forum, 
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how these factors should be applied to ensure future program 
What is the best strategy for countering future 
technological advances in Tactical Ballistic Missile 
capabili ty? Research in this area could include an 
examination of stealth and ECM technology of TBMs, and what 
performance improvements are req'.dred to counter this threat. 
What is the best strategy for deploying this system to 
counter the growing threat of TBM attack? This topic cOClld 
examine the advantages and disadvantages of the foreign 
mi l itary sales of Patriot, the effects of the reduced defense 
budget on the project, and L'le effects of FMS 0:1 the defense 
industrial base. 
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APPENDIX A ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ME Army Acquisition Executive 
Air Breathing Threat 
Airspace Control Order 
Attitude Control System 
Air Defense Tactical Operations Center 
A!'''IC u.s. Army Materiel Corn:n<:md 
AMG Antenna Mast Group 
A!'''ISAA U. S. Army rt..ateriel System Analysis Aeti vi ty 
ARM Anti-Radiation Missile 
ARU Attit~lde Refer.ence Unit 
ASARC Army Systems Acqui"ition R~view Council 
NT'M Anti-Tactical Missile 
Baseline Cost Estimate 
Eatt l efield Operating System 
Batta l ion Tactica l Operations Center 
C3I COlT'TIland, Control, Com:Tlunications, and I:lte l ligence 
Counter Anti-Radiat ion Missile 
Configuration Contro l l:Ioa~d 
Cl assification, DiscriminatiO:l, and Identification 
CDR Critical De"ign Review 
CFA Crossed Field Amplifier 
Cruise Missi le 
Computer IV',,",intenance Panel 
Cos t and Operatioca l Effectiveness Analysis 
Critical Operationa l I ssues ar.d Criteria 
Command Post/Contro l Panel 
Central Proces"ing Unit 
COIl1J'1unica tion Relay Group 
Compu t er Reso'.lrces Life Cycle Management Plan 
CO:ltrol Test Vehicle 
Calenda~ Year 
Defense Acquisition Eoard 
Del:"ionfl t ra t ion/Val ida t ion 
.Digital Link Terminal 
Digita l Lil'.k Terrrdnal Module 
Data Link upgrade 
Defense Material System 
Department cf Defense 
Defense Priorities Syster:! 
Defense Science Board 
Digital Signal Processor 
DTC Design To Cost 
DUSA De puty Under Secretary of the Army 
6l 
EAC Echelons Above Corps 
SCCM Electronic Counter Counter-Measures 
EC!"S ERINT Command and Launch Station 
ECM Electronic Counter Measures 
ECP Engineering Change Proposal 
ECS Engagement Control Sta t ion 
END Engineering and Manu:acturing Development 
EPP Electric Power Plant 
ERINT Extended Range Interceptor 
ERRP Extended Risk Reduct =- on Program 
EWCC Expanded Weapons Control Computer 
FAAD Forward Area Air Defense 
FDT&E Force Development Testing and Experimentation 
ElMS Fo reign Military Sales 
FRP Full Rate Production 
FSC Fire Solution Computer 
? U Fire Unit 
FY Fiscal Year 
GEM Guidance Enhancement Missile 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GPU Guidance Processor Unit 
GTV Guidance Test Vehicle 
HEMTT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck 
HFE Human Factors Engineering 
HRR High Resolution Radar 
HIMAD High-Medium Altitude Air Defense 
ICC Information Coordination Central 
Independent Evaluation Plan 
IER Independent Evaluation Review 
IOC Initial Operational Capability 
IPR In- Process xeview 
IPRR Initial Production Readiness Review 
IR Infra-Red 
lTOC Ir..tegrated Tactical Operations Center 
JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 
LCS Launch Control Station 
I,D Logistics Demonstration 
LE Lethality Enhancer 
LEM Launcher El ectronic Module 
LLI Long Lead Items 
LRIP Low Rate Initial Production 
LS Lau ncher Station 









Missi 1 e 
Manager:1ent 
Package 
MIPA Missile ?rocurCr:1ent Arw.y 
MrJ:G Mu J t i mcde Guidance 
MM!v: Mul timode Missi le 
MrJ:S Miss i le Managemect Station/Multimode Seeker 
MN-SO Materie l Need-Engineering Development 
MRS Mi ssile Review Bcard 
MRRB Materiel Release Review Board 
K8 E Mubi 1 e Sl:bscriber Equipment 
MSU Mass Storage Unit 
l".anufacturing Technolcgy 
MrB l'" Mean Time Between Fai 1 ure 
MT'I'R Mean Time Tc Repair 
NATO North At lantic Treaty Organization 
NAVES Navigat"ion Emp l acement System 
NCTR Non-Cooperative Target Recognition 
NPS North Finding System 
0&0 Operation and Organizational 
0&8 Operation and Suuport 
Operational Test· and Evaluation Ccmmand 













Cut of Sector Launch 
Operational Test and Evaluation 
Fatriot Conduct of Fire Trainer 
I're - Planned Product I mprovements 
Patriot Advanced Capanility 
Product Assurance 
I'roduct Configuration Identification 
Patriot Com.:nand Fost Automation System 
Ferip~'leral Contro l Unit 
Pulse Doppl er 
Post Deployment Build 
I'reliminary Design Review 
Fenetrat ion Aids 
Program Executive Officer 
Prcducibility Engineering and P l anning 
positive Ident:'-tication 
Product I mprovement Proposal 
Pal l etized Load System 
Proj ect~ Manage r 
Precise Position Location and Identification 





































Primary Target Line 
Quick Response Program 
Research and Development 
Random Access Memory 
Reliability, Availab i lity and Maintainability 
Radar Cross Section 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
Radio Frequency 
2emote Launch 
Routing Logic Radio Interface lJnit 
Remotely Piloted Vehicle 
Radar Resident Software 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Aguisition 
Recovery Storage ullit 
Senior Advisory Council 
Surface- to -Air Missile Development 
Senate Arnled Services Committee 
Security Classification Guide 
Sweepdown 
Strategic Defense Initiative 
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization 
Senior Executive Service 
Stand Off J am.'ner 
Senior Review Committee 
Self Screening Jam.'ners 
Systems Threat Assessment Report 
Tactical Air- to-Surface Missile 
Tactical Ballistic Missile 
Technical Data Package 
U. S. Army Test and Evaluation Command 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
Test Integration Working Group 
Technical Manual 
Theater Missile Defense 
Tactical Missi le Defense 
Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment 
Tactical Planner Workstation 
U. S. Army Training and Doctrine CO!l1Il'.and 
Track Via Missile 
Traveling Wave T\.!.oe 
Ultra High Frequency 
VE Value Engineering 
VHF Very High Frequency 
VHSIC Very High Speed Integrated Circuitry 
WCC Weapons Control Computer 
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GUIDANCE: (type) Command and Semi-Active Radar 







Source: U.S. Missile Data Book, 1994 
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Uncla.ssified 
APPENDIX C PATRIOT PAC - 3 ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
Source : Patr i ot Project Office, s eptember 1993 
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APPENDIX 0 PATRIOT 3rSTORICAL MILESTONE DATABAS~ 
Proj8dOffiCilCleatod 
BeoinAdvarc«l De'ielollmcnl (,0.01 
lS1iaullCholAINo.nc:adOll'ltllopmentmis3ilB 
Mvo...:fldOeoltiopmentCOll'l!lletad 
Conlrlld 100' Engineering Oo.eIopmenl (EOI_. rdod 




l si MOAGS IliWTIt&Sl 
DerveryclFU-3tcWSMR 
ec,~r~C! tcrlnilialPrcduclion Faoilily(IPF) awarded 
eonlra<:1<>rAighlleotl co~ottld; Start OTIOT IIte.tillll 
OSARC I II·lim~od P'Ciducricn Decisicnapp<Cval 
Compi elionoiOTiOTtltesling 
CompkllicnolSDDMTes[ Un~1 
C~icn 01 SOOM Tes! Un~ 2 
CompietionoiSDOM Test Unit J 
FuUPr<>(iJctioflDecisionappfOYal 
Oel"eryoll$lProQrClionSII 
Physical Coofl\lUralionAud"t (PC,o,) 
CompIel iOllol ConrpooortlSystemde.igncoofllma.!iOn 
CONUS IDe (lI~ AO,o,; A. Bliss, TX) . 1stunitdeployed fl U.S 
Co""4'\e1icnolSDDMT$tUnil ~ 
COnd.io<1alMalerial Re!ease IUSAREUR) 
loeo.-,us IOC (413 AD .... now ~143: GillSsvn. GE)· 1.t ""~ 10 GIO 
IPATAIO r WRapon SySlem joins NATO 
MOU "'~.Japan 










Source; Patriot Project Office, September 1993 
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PATRIOT HISTORICAL MILESTONES DATABASE 
MILESTONE DATE NOTE 
E-3Graduatiorl MayS6 
PATRIOT Prooram Directive approved o.'as 
IOC · TRADOC Aug 86 
ATM PAC·2 Developmenl Centract awarded 
Deployment 01 PDB·' scftwam (OCONUS) Aug 86 
Deployment 01 PDs.1 software (CONUS) s""as 
"TM PAC'2 msl vs LANCE msl lIightlest Sap 86 @WSMR 
User accep1ance 213 AD (E-3) Oct 86 
Tumoverof PATRIOT equipment 10 Germany Dec 86 
Multiyear Production Contract awartlad Mar 87 
PDB·2 rele;!,se Jul88 
Initial A1M capOil.biijly (PAC I wah POB· 'Z SW) Jul88 
A TM "AC·2 Fielding Sap 90 
PDB·3 ORP $ot\ware release Jun 92 
Radar EnhancelTJl)f1t Phase II production decision (MS Ill) approval Jul92 
Ouick Response Program (ORP) plOduction decision (MS III) approval Jul92 
Source: Patriot Project Office , September 199 3 
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